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Jagadeesh Gokhale, PhD

Social Security’s Trustees have indicated that the Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) trust fund will be fully depleted by late 2016 unless the U.S.
Congress enacts changes before then.
Lawmakers must either add resources or reduce the program’s future benefit obligations. Without such action,
SSDI revenues would be sufficient to pay just 81 percent
of current-law benefits after the trust fund is exhausted.
As in years past, Congress is widely expected to
ensure that current SSDI beneficiaries continue to be
paid benefits at today’s levels. The most likely shortterm change would be to draw upon the resources of the
retirement portion of Social Security—the Old Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund. Over the longer
term, however, the finances of both SSDI and OASI
programs must be reformed because the combined trust
funds are projected to be exhausted by the year 2034. In
particular, SSDI’s history of rapid enrollment growth
indicates serious structural deficiencies that Congress
should seek to rectify.
As described in the Penn Wharton Public Policy
Initiative’s August 2013 brief, “The Urgency of Reforming Entitlement Programs: The Case of Social Security
Disability Insurance,” the number of SSDI beneficiaries
has grown at an alarming rate. From 1980 to 2013 the
population of insured workers receiving SSDI benefits
grew from 4.1% to 6.7%, or from 4.7 million to 11 million people.1 Moreover, in contrast to growth in enroll-

summary
• With the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) trust fund on
the verge of depletion, Congress must enact structural reforms
to the SSDI program that address and counter the rapid growth
in SSDI enrollments in recent years.
• This brief details a work incentive program for SSDI beneficiaries, called the Generalized Benefit Offset (GBO), which would
help get SSDI recipients back into the labor force, enhancing
their own economic welfare while increasing economic output
on a societal level.
• Current SSDI policies, which deny benefits if beneficiaries exceed
a designated income threshold, create a disincentive for SSDI
recipients to return to the workforce. GBO, on the other hand,
avoids this disincentive by providing a subsidy to individuals
who rejoin the workforce, while maintaining their SSDI eligibility.
• Introduced as part of a broader set of reforms in S. 3003
during the 113th Congress, GBO is an approach that can be
combined with other reforms, and merits continued evaluation
by lawmakers serious about tackling SSDI’s financial problems
at a deeper level.
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TABLE 1:

recipients and that could increase
labor force participation and economic
output on a societal level.4

TIMELINE/MILESTONES IN SSDI ADMINISTRATION

• 1956 – SSDI established.
• 1968 – The first of 11 revenue reallocations by Congress across the OASI and SSDI trust funds (in both directions)9

The Policy Landscape
and the Need for
Structural Reform

• 1980 – Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980  which expanded use of continuing disability reviews
(CDRs) to reduce program costs (although opposition led to more stringent criteria for CDRs in 1984).
• 1983 – Social Security Amendments of 1983, which included change of full retirement age from 65 to 67 for
those born after 1960.

Last year, at the end of the 113th
Congress, Senator Tom Coburn
introduced S. 3003 to the Committee on Finance “To Protect the Social
Security Disability Insurance Program
and Provide Other Support for Working Disabled Americans.” This bill
notably incorporated a proposal (see
Generalized Benefit Offset, below) to
introduce work incentives, along with
several other SSDI reform elements.
Lawmakers are beginning the
process of evaluating many “pre-entitlement” reform proposals for introducing early intervention programs to
help workers remain in the workforce
for longer, revising SSDI’s procedures
for determining allowances, and
combating fraud. But they should also
consider changing the program’s benefit structure—a “post-entitlement”
reform to improve incentives for
SSDI beneficiaries to return to work,
if they can, without the threat of losing their SSDI eligibility. Reforms of
this nature would increase the earning

• 1984 – Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 – Changed medical eligibility criteria for CDRs to
make it more difficult to terminate benefits by requiring evidence of medical improvement related to the recipient’s ability to work. Also required HHS secretary to revise the mental disorders criteria, to give greater weight to
functional capacities and subjective pain and less weight to externally observable medical factors. Also required
SSA to consider the combined effect of multiple non-severe impairments rather than the previous requirement for
one or more independently severe impairments.
• 1994 – Funding crisis for SSDI prompted reallocation from OASI, and the SSDI payroll tax rate was raised from
0.5 percent to 0.9 percent, while the OASI rate stayed at 6.2 percent.

similar applicants suggests that more
than one-quarter of those granted
benefits may have residual work
capacity.2 A different study examining
cases at the Administrative Law Judge
stage shows that the likelihood of
working after being rejected for SSDI
benefits is as high as 35 percent.3
This brief builds on the August
2013 brief on “The Urgency of
Reforming Entitlement Programs,”
introducing a way to determine
whether SSDI beneficiaries have
residual work capabilities. In particular, it outlines a post-entitlement
work incentive program that would
be economically beneficial to SSDI

ments over the last three decades, the
rate of terminations due to medical
improvement or earnings above the
Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA)
level has decreased from 29 to just 7
per 1,000 beneficiaries.
It is thus apparent that entry
into SSDI implies near-permanent
dependency on the program’s benefits.
For many beneficiaries, this is because
of the severe nature of their medical impairments. Yet, low observed
recovery rates may also be the result
of the program’s rules, which preclude
working above the SGA level and
maintaining eligibility to SSDI benefits. One study comparing cohorts of
notes
CRS Report R43054, “Social Security Disability Insurance
(DI) Reform: An Overview of Proposals to Manage the Growth
in the DI Rolls,” January 9, 2015.
2 Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J. Mullen, Alexander Strand,
“Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work?  Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of DI
Receipt,” American Economic Review 103, no. 5 (2013): p.
1797-1829.
3 Eric French, Jae Song, “The Effect of Disability Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply: A Dynamic Analysis,” Federal Reserve
1

4

Bank of Chicago Working Paper no. 2012-12, 2012.
For additional background information on the SSDI program,
including its history, recent enrollment growth and causes,
changes in eligibility (especially for conditions that are noncertifiable medically), the economy’s effects on the program,
the application and adjudication processes, and an explanation on how SSDI financially traps beneficiaries and keeps
them out of the workforce, refer to the previous Issue Brief
here: http://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/issue-brief/
v1n8.php.

2

5

This last category of reforms is more administrative in
nature. Examples of such reforms could encompass elimination of the early retirement option at 62; increased work
requirements, both recent and total; adjusted age categories
for vocational factors; inclusion of Social Security Administration representation at Administrative Law Judge hearings;
updating of SSA’s listing of impairments; increasing the incidence of Continuing Disability Reviews; supported work policies in tandem with experience rating for employer payroll
tax rates; employer-sponsored private disability insurance;
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emerge from it. A system that continues to pay benefits only if earnings
remain below a low dollar limit, and
only if there is insufficient medical
improvement, will naturally induce
beneficiaries to remain out of the
workforce and to not seek improvements in their health and vocational
abilities with any urgency.
The remainder of this brief examines the creation of incentives for
SSDI beneficiaries with residual work
capacity to resume work at aboveSGA levels without fear of benefit
termination.6 This is accomplished by
providing a generalized benefit offset
(GBO) that is scaled to beneficiary
earnings. Policies in this vein have
been instituted in other countries,
including Norway, Britain, Sweden
and Australia.7

into SSDI. But comprehensive and
regular testing of the SSDI insured
worker population to provide such
supports would be costly and may
induce worker behavior to qualify for
such services.
Introducing employer incentives
to provide employment supports to
workers—for example, by experience
rating SSDI payroll taxes—is also
not without pitfalls. Such a policy
may make employers reluctant to hire
workers with disabilities. In general,
policies to prevent or delay applications to SSDI may prove costly and
may be difficult to enact because
SSDI benefits constitute an “earned
right” under the law. Program enrollment growth arising from procedural
shortcomings, loopholes, lax enforcement of eligibility rules, or insufficient
training of adjudicators therefore
should be addressed with direct
reforms to those program elements.
The challenge with tightening eligibility conditions is the risk
of alienating well-organized and
invested constituencies of workers,
beneficiaries, and disability advocacy
groups. But the challenge to providing
incentives for beneficiaries to return
to the workforce arises directly from
SSDI’s definition of disability and the
operational eligibility conditions that

Under the current system, a disabled
individual who is earning “too much”
(i.e., someone who consistently
surpasses the dollar earnings limit of
the Trial Work Period (TWP) rule) is
suspended from SSDI benefits.8 This
effectively discourages individuals with
residual work capacity—including
those who may be going through the

Andreas Ravndal Kostol and Magne Mogstad, “How Financial Incentives Induce Disability Insurance Recipients
to Return to Work” http://www.nber.org/papers/w19016.
Richard Burkhauser, Mary Daly, Duncan McVicar, Roger
Wilkins, “Disability Benefit Growth and Disability Reform in
the U.S.: Lessons from Other OECD Nations,” IZA Journal of
Labor Policy, February 20, 2014.
8 A month counts toward the Trial Work Period if earnings
exceed a dollar limit applicable during the year.  In 2015
the limit is $780. Accrual of 9 TWP months within the last

60 months results in benefit suspension.  Benefit termination occurs if earnings remain above the SGA level during
the Extended Trial Work Period (ETWP) of an additional 36
months.
9 David C. Stapleton, Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 71 No. 3,
2011. Kathy Ruffing and Paul N. Van de Water, “Congress
Needs to Boost Disability Insurance Share of Payroll Tax
by 2016,” available at http://www.cbpp.org/research/
congress-needs-to-boost-disability-insurance-share-ofpayroll-tax-by-2016.

potential of beneficiaries and remove
the undesirable result of SSDI’s current benefit structure—of inducing
SSDI beneficiaries with residual work
capability to stay out of the workforce.
Reform efforts can be grouped
into four categories:
1. Providing early support services—
remediation, counseling, health care,
and work-accommodations—to help
those experiencing disability onset
to remain in the workforce
2. Tightening eligibility conditions for
program entry
3. Improving adjudication accuracy,
preventing fraud, and reducing
improper payments
4. Replacing work disincentives in
SSDI’s benefit structure with work
incentives to induce work-capable
SSDI beneficiaries to return to work
voluntarily5
The challenge in designing incentives for workers to delay or forego
applying to SSDI lies in the proper
identification of workers at risk of
developing debilitating conditions
well before their condition deteriorates to the point of no return and
compels an application to SSDI. Early
provision of employment supports,
health care services, and counseling
can prolong time on the job and may
postpone or prevent eventual entry

The Generalized Benefit
Offset Model

notes
6

and improved early intervention programs.
As with Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), SSDI benefits are based on a worker’s past earnings. Individuals must
be unable to sustain earnings at or above the substantial
gainful activity (SGA) level because of a mental or physical
impairment that is expected to last at least one year or result
in death. The current monthly level of SGA is $1,090 for
non-blind and $1,820 for blind individuals. Eligibility for SSDI
also qualifies the disabled worker’s spouse and children for
dependent benefits.
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lengthy SSDI application process, or
who have enrolled in SSDI but have
adapted to their health conditions and
regained some work capacity—from
earning more than $13,000 per year,
to avoid jeopardizing their SSDI eligibility. The fear of suffering a relapse
in one’s health condition after losing
SSDI eligibility because of high earnings may be inducing most beneficiaries to disengage from the labor force.
Accordingly, the data on who
among SSDI beneficiaries actually can
and cannot work is poor. This situation has also plagued SSA-operated
pilot projects—including Ticket to
Work, Benefit Offset Pilot Demonstration, Benefit Offset National
Demonstration—which were designed
to encourage beneficiaries to return to
the labor force by offering to reduce
benefits by $1 for every $2 of earnings above the SGA level. In these
cases, naturally risk-averse individuals
who have previously experienced a
work-limiting disability may not be
convinced that they will retain eligibility for SSDI, should they need it,
after the demonstration programs are
terminated.
A better system would be one
that: 1) pays individuals to rejoin the
workforce if they can by offering a
subsidy to earnings at the margin, and
2) maintains eligibility even in periods
when the benefit is not paid, thereby
readjusting SSDI benefits upon any
decline or loss of earnings due to
fluctuating health or labor market
conditions.
As illustrated by Figure 1, the
proposed GBO system incorporates
these two elements, and in so doing
circumvents the disincentive of the
cash cliff associated with losing SSDI

benefits under current law at the SGA
threshold.
Consider the following stylized example. Under current law, a
beneficiary with a primary insurance
amount (PIA) of $1,150 and zero

When earnings equal SGA, therefore,
the beneficiary’s total income encounters a “cash cliff ”—as shown by the
line in red dashed line in Figure 1.
Under GBO, the safety-net
benefit (the line in blue dashes) is

FIGURE 1: GBO AND CURRENT-LAW SSDI INCOME SCHEDULES
(SSDI PRIMARY INSURANCE AMOUNT = $1,150)
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Source: Author’s GBO benefit design.

earnings has total income of $1,150.
If the beneficiary joins the work-force
and begins to earn wages, total income
increases dollar-for-dollar with earnings until earnings reach the SGA
level of $1,090. When earnings equal
SGA, total income equals $2,240.
However, earning just one dollar more
than SGA disqualifies the beneficiary and total income falls to $1,091.
4

increased slightly above the PIA
($1,150) at zero earnings but declines
at a constant rate as earnings increase.
In exchange for the enhancement to
the benefit at zero earnings, beneficiary earnings are subject to a tax
when earnings are positive but low.
However, the tax rate on earnings is
reduced as earnings increase, and it is
eventually converted into a subsidy at
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higher earnings levels. This earnings
subsidy is the wage-incentive component of GBO’s benefit structure.
The sum of earnings, the safetynet benefit, and the wage incentive
payment make up the beneficiary’s
total income (shown as the unbroken
blue line in Figure 1). It shows that
for a considerable range of earnings beyond the SGA level, working
beneficiaries could have much higher
total income under GBO than under
current law. Indeed, the slope of the
total GBO income is steeper than the
45 degree line for earnings around the
SGA level—providing a significant
net incentive for SSDI beneficiaries to
rejoin the workforce.
This type of two-pronged benefit
structure for SSDI, which includes
full protection of working beneficiaries’ SSDI eligibility—the right to quit
work (for health or any other reason)
and have full safety-net SSDI benefits
restored—would eliminate the fear of
permanent loss of SSDI benefits and
would likely induce stronger efforts by
SSDI beneficiaries to return to work.
Restructuring the SSDI benefit in this
manner is likely to work better than
the aforementioned “$1 for $2” benefit offset work-incentive pilots and
demonstration projects that the Social
Security Administration is currently
testing. Those pilots eliminate the current law cash cliff, but replace it with
a very poor work incentive system.
Indeed, the “$1 for $2” benefit-offset
ratio may be viewed by beneficiaries
as a 50 percent marginal tax rate on
earnings—and, thus, not a very strong
return-to-work incentive. GBO’s
benefit structure, in effect, reverses the
rationale for SSDI benefits, switching
it from a payment to remain idle to

one that rewards work.
Under GBO, work-incentive subsidy payments to working beneficiaries
would be funded via an annual provision to SSA from the general budget account (mandatory rather than
discretionary, similar to the funding of
non-premium-covered expenditures
for Medicare Parts B and D).
Adopting GBO would be very
beneficial for SSDI beneficiaries and
the national economy given current
program conditions. With many
workers qualifying for SSDI benefits
during economic downturns on the
basis of difficult-to-medically-certify
health diagnoses, beneficiaries’ residual
work abilities remain unknown. The
problem is compounded by the cashcliff under current laws which may be
inducing many work-capable beneficiaries to remain out of the workforce
for fear of losing eligibility to SSDI
benefits. GBO’s stronger work incentive structure would reveal who among
SSDI beneficiaries can and cannot
work by providing them with a reason
to voluntarily make choices appropriate to their specific health conditions
and residual abilities. Those who can
work would choose to do so, to take
advantage of GBO’s earnings subsidy.
Those who remain out of the labor
force despite GBO’s work incentive
system would reveal their health conditions to be fully disabling.
Note, however, that GBO’s success depends crucially on excluding
earnings as a criterion for withdrawing SSDI eligibility from those who
previously were deemed qualified for
SSDI benefits based on the decision
criteria written into law. For GBO
to operate effectively, a certifiable
medical improvement relative to the
5

condition that triggered SSDI eligibility should be the only reason for
which beneficiaries could be disqualified from SSDI.

Estimating GBO’s Budget
Cost Compared to
Current SSDI Rules
There is considerable uncertainty
about the extent to which SSDI
beneficiaries might expand their labor
force participation under GBO. The
only way to fully reveal this information, of course, would be to directly
and fully introduce GBO in place
of SSDI’s current benefit system.
Doing so is unlikely to involve new
and significant taxpayer costs unless
GBO induces a commensurate and
beneficial behavioral response from
SSDI beneficiaries to return to work.
Thus, whereas some other SSDI
reform proposals require up-front
investments before reaping SSDI cost
savings, GBO requires an up-front
beneficial outcome before incurring
any taxpayer costs.
Estimating GBO’s cost ahead
of its implementation inherently
requires one to estimate the behavioral
response that GBO would produce in
terms of return-to-work by SSDI beneficiaries. However, if GBO induces
a significant number of workers to
begin earning more than the SGA
level, GBO’s cost should be measured
against the pre-behavioral-change cost
of maintaining current law—where
current law benefit payments would
continue. Comparing GBO’s cost
against current law when the latter is
evaluated on a post-behavioral change
basis—where it would be zero for
those who commence earning more
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than SGA because of GBO—would
understate the cost of the status
quo relative to implementing GBO.
Unfortunately, there is little information available publicly to evaluate
GBO’s costs relative to projections
under current SSDI laws. A useful step would be for Social Security
actuaries to provide cost estimates for
a GBO-type reform based on the best
information available to them.
It should be noted that, notwithstanding the paucity of information about its potential behavioral
impact, implementing GBO is likely
to prove beneficial. It would act as a
backstop to reduce the economic loss
from inaccurate SSDI allowances by
incentivizing beneficiaries to return
to work, if they can. Thus, it would
directly generate the missing information over time about beneficiaries’
remaining work capabilities. Second,
GBO is complementary to, and likely
to enhance the beneficial effects of,
other pre- and post-entitlement
reforms that lawmakers and others
have proposed. Third, the additional
budget cost that GBO may require, if
and when beneficiaries return to work,
is likely to be recouped by gains in
economic productivity and output and
by improvements in working beneficiaries’ living standards. Fourth, working beneficiaries under GBO would
also accrue higher retirement benefits
after they are shifted to OASI upon
reaching their full retirement ages.
Fifth, GBO is unlikely to incent entry
into SSDI by workers with marginal
health impairments, as the waiting
time for being approved would only
hinder their accrual of earnings and
OASI retirement benefits. Overall,
GBO is likely to provide workers and

disabled beneficiaries better economic
protection against market and health
risks without compromising work
incentives. And last, but not least,
GBO would increase the psychological well-being of individuals
with disabilities from greater community participation and self-support
through work.

Conclusion
The factors behind the escalation in
SSDI enrollments and outlays are
complex but it’s clear that deeper
program reforms are overdue. The
focus on providing SSDI benefits to
only those who do not work above the
SGA likely dampens labor participation and induces those with medical
impairments to seek out and remain
permanently dependent on SSDI
benefits.
Legislative initiatives to directly
alter SSDI procedures and tighten
eligibility criteria, or to increase SSDI
payroll taxes, will face very strong
resistance from well-organized political interest groups concerned with
preserving the status quo. Nonetheless, policymakers today appreciate
the financial jeopardy that the SSDI
program is facing and the need to look
beyond short-term resource reallocations from the OASI trust fund.
It is against this backdrop that the
generalized benefit offset model, or
GBO, offers a more robust approach
than prior SSA pilots to incentivize
labor market reentry by SSDI beneficiaries with residual work capacity.
Introduced as part of a broader set of
reforms in S. 3003 during the 113th
Congress, it is an approach that can
be combined with other reforms and
6

merits continued evaluation by lawmakers serious about tackling SSDI’s
financial problems at a deeper level.
Straightforward economic analysis
suggests that GBO would provide
stronger work incentives with sizable economic benefits at minimal
cost. That’s because GBO reverses the
reason why SSDI beneficiaries receive
payments. It is a model that moves
away from effectively discouraging
beneficiaries from returning to work
and towards encouraging those who
can return to work to do so. It accomplishes this by introducing a wageincentive payment linked to earnings
and offsets its cost by reducing the
trust fund-financed benefits of those
who can work. And GBO protects
SSDI beneficiaries’ eligibility for the
program’s safety net benefits because
of earnings, as job separations for
health or other reasons lead to safety
net benefits being reinstated. Such
a flexible and two-pronged SSDI
benefit system is more likely to induce
work-capable beneficiaries to return to
work—a choice many SSDI insured
workers would make voluntarily, but
cannot, given the current “cash cliff ”
at the SGA threshold. And SSDI
beneficiaries would continue to accrue
earnings under GBO to potentially
obtain higher OASI benefits upon
reaching retirement age.
In addition to addressing the
SSDI trust fund shortfalls through
short-term resource transfer from
OASI, Congress should consider a
new, GBO-like benefit structure for
SSDI to improve the overall financial
welfare of individuals with disabilities
and increase national productivity
and output.
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